Military Blunders, Tactics, strategy, maneuvers...

jerry old

Texas Crude
Currently trying to wander through Shelby Forte's 2,942 page trilogy of the Civil War.
I doubt I will complete it.

The tactics of the war during the first year were virtually the same as the Revolutionary War.
The British would march their troops in mass to the battle line and let them fall.
The Rebel tried the same tactics, but lack the ratio of men needed.

In the Civil War they would march two or three companies into the enemy's positions-when these men were obliterated, march the next two or three companies...
(Yea, we kill'um, but we don't kill'um all at one time.)

The recruits were bewildered (and dead or wounded), The survivors asked where is the glory, where is the acknowledgement of our valor?-
'My comrades are dead or shot all too hell: this was not what I thought it would be like.'

]There are battles that I have never understood completely.
I do know that Grant's strategy was Total War: Tactic's be damned, Attrition will determine the winner.
He gave lip service to the slaughter of his troops. 'Ah well, the fortunes of war.'
(This is the same man who's maneuvers at Vicksburg are studied today-he knew how to avoid casualties, but choose attrition-why?)]
 

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Currently trying to wander through Shelby Forte's 2,942 page trilogy of the Civil War.
I doubt I will complete it.

The tactics of the war during the first year were virtually the same as the Revolutionary War.
The British would march their troops in mass to the battle line and let them fall.
The Rebel tried the same tactics, but lack the ratio of men needed.

In the Civil War they would march two or three companies into the enemy's positions-when these men were obliterated, march the next two or three companies...
(Yea, we kill'um, but we don't kill'um all at one time.)

The recruits were bewildered (and dead or wounded), The survivors asked where is the glory, where is the acknowledgement of our valor?-
'My comrades are dead or shot all too hell: this was not what I thought it would be like.'

]There are battles that I have never understood completely.
I do know that Grant's strategy was Total War: Tactic's be damned, Attrition will determine the winner.
He gave lip service to the slaughter of his troops. 'Ah well, the fortunes of war.'
(This is the same man who's maneuvers at Vicksburg are studied today-he knew how to avoid casualties, but choose attrition-why?)]
Unlike many who write on tactics and strategy I have had combat experience and military training. (Intelligence Officer) What determines the outcome of a war is the financial and natural resources of a nation and manpower. The nation that has the most natural resources and manpower will eventually win. (Now in very rare cases this is not true.) Russia was defeated in World War One when it had superior manpower and resources. However RUSSIA had been in a virtual CIVIL War since 1905, with minority groups in rebellion and political factions bombing and killing each other in the streets. When the war started with Germany there was no SOCIAL COHESION to effectivly harness the superior manpower and resources to prosecute the war. The loss of social cohesion is the greatest danger to a nation in conflict. The American Civil War went on as long as it did and was as bloody as it was because both the north and the south had very strong social cohesion. The south had greater SOCIAL COHESION but not the resources or manpower to prosecute the war. The North did not have as great SOCIAL COHESION (New York Draft Riots, as well as anti war protests in other locations) but had superior natural resources and manpower it could call upon.
 
Jamesed:
Strongly agree: resources and manpower are essential.
You have to wonder what the South was thinking So far (Book I) Jefferson Davis major weapon was the absolute certainty of the need to have Britain come to their rescue.
I'm sure you have a vast knowledge of logistics-again, what was the South thinking?
I',m only on page 200 or so, by the second year of the Civil War it was obvious to any observer, that was not emotionally involved, that the South
was going to lose the war.

Jefferson Davis had dictatorial powers in the South, he knew it was an unwinable conntest. Yet, he could not/would not cease the struggle.

Now, the bigggie, Resources and Manpower and the Logistical ability to get them where there need is crucial.
So how to we explain the 15 year nonsense in AFgan, before that Vietnam, also South America.
Now how do we disrupt the above?
Yes, they can be halted for what, six months, a year....but how do you stop a insurrection in it's tracks with assurance it will not return.

It can not be a military problem-agree or disagree.

(Misd. A Civil War Rebe; Gemera; Berford (sp) Forrest a semi-literate at best stated, 'You gott'a get there firstus with the mostest.' miscellaneous
 

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Go on YouTube and watch/listen to the National Parks Service guides explain what happened at Gettysburg. Good stuff. I walked that Battlefield hundreds of times. I never get tired of going there.
 
Not sure you'd call it a blunder, but, we were issued an entrenching tool when I first got to Vietnam. 😂 Just try digging a hole in the delta region of that country. (water, water, everywhere) You couldn't dig a foot without hitting water.

Now, for a real blunder, we were trained in the states to fight ala WWII. You know, dig in, fortify, and advance, take the high ground, while fighting an enemy that stood firm and fought back. Not much use in the jungles, rice paddies,etc. especially when you were fighting hit and run gorilla fighters. Took a fast learning curve if you wanted to survive. :(
 
Unlike many who write on tactics and strategy I have had combat experience and military training. (Intelligence Officer) What determines the outcome of a war is the financial and natural resources of a nation and manpower. The nation that has the most natural resources and manpower will eventually win. (Now in very rare cases this is not true.) Russia was defeated in World War One when it had superior manpower and resources. However RUSSIA had been in a virtual CIVIL War since 1905, with minority groups in rebellion and political factions bombing and killing each other in the streets. When the war started with Germany there was no SOCIAL COHESION to effectivly harness the superior manpower and resources to prosecute the war. The loss of social cohesion is the greatest danger to a nation in conflict. The American Civil War went on as long as it did and was as bloody as it was because both the north and the south had very strong social cohesion. The south had greater SOCIAL COHESION but not the resources or manpower to prosecute the war. The North did not have as great SOCIAL COHESION (New York Draft Riots, as well as anti war protests in other locations) but had superior natural resources and manpower it could call upon.

Gee, that part I marked in bold sounds pretty much like the US today. :(

Tony
 
I've always wonder about the effectiveness of bombing. In WWII, even with the Nordon site, they estimate 1 bomb out every 600 bombs dropped actually hit the target. The Brits held up under the blitz, but so did the Germans, and the Japanese. Both of those suffered catastrophic fire bombings, again with little real affect. In Vietnam, the US dropped way more tons of bombs than in WWII, but it had little real affect. I believe some look at the wide spread destruction of a city and believe that will cause moral to falter, and cripple production of goods. I doubt blowing up the corner fruit stand and homes, does anything other the add to wanton destruction. And even if factories are bombed, that does not destroy the ingenuity and inventiveness of workers. In Germany, war production did not mean fully fall until its factories fell into enemy hands, rather than the result of bombings.
 
Civil War;
The North was unhappy that England and France were chummy with the South and ignored them
(They're trading continued to be strong, but these European Nations were coolly watching and evaluating the war's progress.)

In 1860 two Russian Fleets arrived in America, one in California, the other in NY the Yankees perceived this visit as a good will
mission by the Ruskies. The Russian Fleets wintered in America for six months, sailing away in the spring.
The Yankees felt all warm and fuzzy. 'See, even the Czar is on our side.'
Yea, Ruskies!

THe Russians had no interest in our Civil War; they had a strong interest in our warm water ports.
There was a strong possibility of a war between Russia and European Powers; Russia did not want to have
their fleets in their home ports, which froze over every winter.


Obviously, Abe Lincoln and his merry bunch knew what the Ruskies were doing here.
They perfered to let their population celeberate their ignorance than explain
why the Ruskies were actually in Anerican Ports
Yea Ruskies(y)
Boo Lincoln and his secret ways(n)
 
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My 28 year old PC won't post link, I have to copy and past, which is a poor method.

There are several items on the net regarding these "Moron Corps"

These Moron Corp individuals stores are extremely interesting to me.

WW II- Same thing. I meet one of these Ex-GI's. His story is funny and a bit tragic.
I've intended to post it, but it is too long.

McNamara's "Moron Corps"
HBO's "Path to War" leaves out some of the most shameful brainstorms of the Vietnam War's masterminds -- including a little-known recruitment program that turned the mentally and physically deficient into cannon fodder.
The highly acclaimed HBO movie "Path to War" powerfully details President Lyndon Johnson's descent into the disastrous quagmire of Vietnam. LBJ is depicted, in part, as a victim of his defense secretary, Robert McNamara's, intellectual arrogance and duplicity. But the film spares McNamara from the deeper moral condemnation he deserves, entirely overlooking, for instance, one of his most heinous acts as the chief architect of the war -- a cynical recruitment gambit aimed at the underclass known as "Project 100,000."
The HBO film premiered on May 18, but it continues to play in heavy rotation -- in fact, it can be seen twice on Thursday, at 4 p.m. and midnight EST -- which is why the untold story of McNamara's Vietnam years bears closer review. In the film, Alec Baldwin admirably depicts McNamara's buttoned-up style and automaton-like self-assurance. The bespectacled "Whiz Kid" was an engineer of death, known for his dispassionate litanies of bomb tonnage and civilian and troop casualties. In one scene, McNamara is shown "grading" various aspects of a planned bombing operation aimed at North Vietnam. When he is told that the number of civilians killed might be high, he says, "Give it a D."
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As the months drag on, his estimates of how much punishment North Vietnam can sustain before it surrenders prove woefully wrong, but the Pentagon chief continues to urge escalation, while in private confiding to friends that the war cannot be won. One of those friends was Johnson's nemesis, Bobby Kennedy. When LBJ finally eases his defense secretary out (to become president of the World Bank), McNamara is not conscience-stricken about his management of the war; in fact, he wistfully wants to remain at the Pentagon -- despite the enormous stress his job has brought to his wife and family, which "Path to War" graphically illustrates.
"Path to War" strives hard to humanize McNamara -- there are brief views of him agonizing at the grave of President Kennedy, choking up at his farewell speech and offering a half admission at a congressional hearing that "expectations" of winning might not be realized.
But in doing this, the film overlooks the darkest aspects of his reign as a Vietnam War mastermind, including his shameful brainchild, Project 100,000. By 1966, President Johnson was fearful that calling up the reserves or abolishing student deferments would further inflame war protesters and signal all-out war. And so, even after McNamara began privately declaring the war was unwinnable, the defense secretary devised Project 100,000.




Under his direction, an alternative army was systematically recruited from the ranks of those who had previously been rejected for failing to meet the armed services' physical and mental requirements. Recruiters swept through urban ghettos and Southern rural back roads, even taking at least one youth with an I.Q. of 62. In all, 354,000 men were rolled up by Project 100,000. Touted as a Great Society program that would provide remedial education and an escape from poverty, the recruitment program offered a one-way ticket to Vietnam, where "the Moron Corps," as they were pathetically nicknamed by other soldiers, entered combat in disproportionate numbers. Although Johnson was a vociferous civil rights advocate, the program took a heavy toll on young blacks. A 1970 Defense Department study disclosed that 41 percent of Project 100,000 recruits were black, compared with 12 percent in the armed forces as a whole. What's more, 40 percent of Project 100,000 recruits were trained for combat, compared with 25 percent for the services generally.



Since "Path to War" makes much of Johnson's civil rights concerns, the filmmakers had a perfect place to introduce the awful irony of Project 100,000 -- the scene where LBJ pins a Purple Heart on a wounded black soldier. Unfortunately, few today recall this particularly shameful chapter from the war. Even two decades ago, accounts of Project 100,000 in my book "Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation" were met with disbelief -- even by many who had lived through the era. Soldiers remembered it, however. As Herb DeBose, a former black first lieutenant who was director of a New York City employment program for veterans, said at that time, "I think McNamara should be shot. I saw him when he resigned from the World Bank, crying about the poor children of the world. But if he did not cry at all for any of those men he took in under Project 100,000, then he really doesn't know what crying is all about. Many weren't even on a 5th-grade level."
Do not look to Robert McNamara's 1995 memoir or his more recent musings for any information on this project. "In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam," his bloodless account of how he and his colleagues in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were "wrong, terribly wrong" about Vietnam, conveniently ignores this deplorable brainstorm of his.
 

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