grahamg
Old codger
- Location
- South of Manchester, UK
I wonder whether anyone will engage with the arguments put forward by Professor Akira Morita of Tokyo University for me? Quote:
www.law2.byu.edu/wfpc/forum/2000/WFPF2000.pdf
Brief extracts:
"Here I would like to point out only that the United States, as the pioneer of the development of children’s law in the twentieth century, is the very country that has experienced most intensively the significance and gravity of the conflict between organic human relations and rights based relations. I would like to quote a passage from a dissertation written in 1992 by legal scholar Dr James Lucier that provided a theoretical foundation for the anti-ratification movement: What is missing in the 'UN Convention on the rights of the child' is the underlying idea of rights for families. . . . By endowing the child with legal autonomy, that is to say, enjoying rights independently of the family, the new doctrine puts the family in the position of mere care-givers, bound to the observance of the child’s rights. Every child becomes the adversary of the parents, at least in the potential, and the adversary of brothers and sisters in competition for rights. . . . By destroying the human factor in human relationships, the advocate of autonomy, especially the autonomy of children, will create a society which lacks the principles of cohesiveness and common purpose necessary to its common existence.
Break
I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that the concept of children’s rights in itself is completely meaningless. The reality is that within the increasing complexity of modern society, parental authority has become dysfunctional and abusive, and we must recognize that there are many cases in which the child’s right to protection is compelled to take on the role of an emergency fire brigade. Even in such cases, however, we need to remember the words of Josef Goldstein, that “law [and rights] may be able to destroy human relationships, but it does not have the power to compel them to develop.” In other words, rights cannot be an Aladdin’s lamp that brings happiness. What children need most is the relationship itself, not an isolated benefit conferred in the name of rights. If we forget that law and rights have such limitations and think of the “Convention on the Rights of the Child” and its catalogue as a “magna carta for children,” we will be walking into the myth and fantasy of twentieth century that children’s rights constitute.
Abridged Conclusion
I want to conclude by searching for clues in terms of a reassessment of the image of modern man that lies behind the concept of the child’s right to autonomy. As I have mentioned, behind the concept of the child’s right to autonomy is the surrealistic view of the child as “a little acorn that grows up autonomously.” It soon becomes plain to anyone that this view, when illuminated by the light of ordinary everyday experience, is lacking in realism. It is no more than an idealization and romanticization of autonomy. Nevertheless, why is this concept so highly contagious that it is becoming a fixture in today’s international conventions and conquering the western world? When we get to the bottom of the matter, we arrive at the modernistic image of man, dating from the eighteenth century onward, that regards complete autonomy in itself as a legitimate possibility and holds it up as the ultimate ideal. That is, the ideal depicts the individual as the “lone rights-bearer” who has cast off all restrictions and connections and is self determining and self-contained. What props up this ideal is a passion for emancipation—to throw off the shackles that bind and thereby gain freedom. The appearance of the child’s right to autonomy that we are witnessing today is none other than a symbolic event that tells us that this ideal of modern man has finally reached down, two hundred years after the French Revolution, to the intermediating body positioned as the very basis of society—the family."
WORLD FAMILY POLICY FORUM 2000, Brigham Young University, Utah.
www.law2.byu.edu/wfpc/forum/2000/WFPF2000.pdf
Brief extracts:
"Here I would like to point out only that the United States, as the pioneer of the development of children’s law in the twentieth century, is the very country that has experienced most intensively the significance and gravity of the conflict between organic human relations and rights based relations. I would like to quote a passage from a dissertation written in 1992 by legal scholar Dr James Lucier that provided a theoretical foundation for the anti-ratification movement: What is missing in the 'UN Convention on the rights of the child' is the underlying idea of rights for families. . . . By endowing the child with legal autonomy, that is to say, enjoying rights independently of the family, the new doctrine puts the family in the position of mere care-givers, bound to the observance of the child’s rights. Every child becomes the adversary of the parents, at least in the potential, and the adversary of brothers and sisters in competition for rights. . . . By destroying the human factor in human relationships, the advocate of autonomy, especially the autonomy of children, will create a society which lacks the principles of cohesiveness and common purpose necessary to its common existence.
Break
I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that the concept of children’s rights in itself is completely meaningless. The reality is that within the increasing complexity of modern society, parental authority has become dysfunctional and abusive, and we must recognize that there are many cases in which the child’s right to protection is compelled to take on the role of an emergency fire brigade. Even in such cases, however, we need to remember the words of Josef Goldstein, that “law [and rights] may be able to destroy human relationships, but it does not have the power to compel them to develop.” In other words, rights cannot be an Aladdin’s lamp that brings happiness. What children need most is the relationship itself, not an isolated benefit conferred in the name of rights. If we forget that law and rights have such limitations and think of the “Convention on the Rights of the Child” and its catalogue as a “magna carta for children,” we will be walking into the myth and fantasy of twentieth century that children’s rights constitute.
Abridged Conclusion
I want to conclude by searching for clues in terms of a reassessment of the image of modern man that lies behind the concept of the child’s right to autonomy. As I have mentioned, behind the concept of the child’s right to autonomy is the surrealistic view of the child as “a little acorn that grows up autonomously.” It soon becomes plain to anyone that this view, when illuminated by the light of ordinary everyday experience, is lacking in realism. It is no more than an idealization and romanticization of autonomy. Nevertheless, why is this concept so highly contagious that it is becoming a fixture in today’s international conventions and conquering the western world? When we get to the bottom of the matter, we arrive at the modernistic image of man, dating from the eighteenth century onward, that regards complete autonomy in itself as a legitimate possibility and holds it up as the ultimate ideal. That is, the ideal depicts the individual as the “lone rights-bearer” who has cast off all restrictions and connections and is self determining and self-contained. What props up this ideal is a passion for emancipation—to throw off the shackles that bind and thereby gain freedom. The appearance of the child’s right to autonomy that we are witnessing today is none other than a symbolic event that tells us that this ideal of modern man has finally reached down, two hundred years after the French Revolution, to the intermediating body positioned as the very basis of society—the family."
WORLD FAMILY POLICY FORUM 2000, Brigham Young University, Utah.
