Russia and China?
- Thread starter Ruthanne
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RFW
Certified Night Owl
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- United States
They have always been buddy-buddy since the dawn of time. I posted a video a few days ago about how China has already been brainwashing young generation to call for violence against Russia and China's enemies.
Aunt Bea
SF VIP
- Location
- Near Mount Pilot
I'm wondering if that is propaganda to make Putin appear weak.
If it's true, I hope that the Chinese have the good sense to stay out of it.
If it's true, I hope that the Chinese have the good sense to stay out of it.
Well it was on the news here but who knows if it's so. Maybe more will come out on the news. I don't honestly know what to think.
RFW
Certified Night Owl
- Location
- United States
I'd like to point out that even though they're allies, they're also friends with benefits. If the benefits of offering Russia help officially don't outweigh what China has to lose then we probably won't see anything about it in mainstream media. The fact remains that the two nations have always been helping each other economically and strategically through both official and unofficial channels.
Murrmurr
SF VIP
- Location
- Sacramento, California
I mentioned this on another thread, too - This puts China in a bad position because the CCP doesn't want the kind of sanctions that the west has put on Russia. They are very serious sanctions (finally). They hit Putin's oligarchs and minions really hard, and Xi has a bunch of his own oligarchs and minions himself. He's up for re-election this year and their votes decide the election. The people don't vote for the president.
Who votes in the elections? Chinese government people?
RFW
Certified Night Owl
- Location
- United States
He has also gotten rid of some who didn't favor him so I don't think the election is a cause of concern to him. He has a growing problem within the country where regular folks keep getting poorer and they are starting to wise up and rise up.
Harry Le Hermit
Member
That won't happen, imo.
Nosy Bee-54
Senior Member
The news in the West is slanted and I just don't know what to believe. Why would Russia or China reveal or announce such to the public? This seems more like propaganda. I read in the UK Daily Mail last week that Ukrainians killed 11,000+ Russian soldiers. Only the gullible would believe that. So the publishers certainly know how to slant news in favor of Ukraine and the West. There is a lot of disinformation during a war.
When the US invaded a sovereign Iraq in 2003 based on the big lie, I never saw any pics of mass exodus or buildings being bombed during "Shock & Awe." News media did a thorough job of keeping that from the masses. Some 151,000+ innocent Iraqis (men, women and children) were killed according to the UN and human rights groups. So it just shows how bias the media is.
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Murrmurr
SF VIP
- Location
- Sacramento, California
Yes. The Committee.
Murrmurr
SF VIP
- Location
- Sacramento, California
After seeing how well current sanctions are working, I think it would happen. However, if the sh** hits the fan for the west due to the current sanctions, then you're right, they won't do it.
Warrigal
SF VIP
- Location
- Sydney, Australia
There is a reason why Xi might not want to get involved militarily.
China is now a modern economy and is more dependent on trade with other nations than Russia. Russia really only has oil and gas to export but China exports manufactured goods to many countries.
The same kind of sanctions that Russia is experiencing would hit China very hard.
Xi is smarter than Putin. All the China is likely to do is cheer from the side lines.
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Were you asleep during history class? Numerous conflicts since the dawn of time.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_border_conflict
https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Sino-Soviet_conflict_(1929)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_invasion_of_Manchuria
Warrigal
SF VIP
- Location
- Sydney, Australia
An interesting article analysing why Putin's military is rather ineffective.
Russia's military is out of its depth in Ukraine. Was Putin kept in the dark about its weaknesses?
In March 2017, Commander of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov wrote an article about how the Russian military was being transformed so they could fight "war in modern conditions". The article provided an update on his now seminal 2013 article on modern warfare, which many in the West mischaracterised as the "Gerasimov Doctrine". Perhaps the most interesting part of his 2017 article — and ironic for the Russian military forces — is this passage:
It has been the unity and desire to oppose aggression of the Ukrainians in the past two weeks upon which the vaunted Russian military forces have foundered. Because of this, many now question the effectiveness of Russian military reforms over the past decade. What lessons might Western military forces, and their government bosses, take from Russian military operations in Ukraine and the preceding reform program?
In theory, Russia was on the right track
Between 2008 and 2012, the Russian military discarded many of its legacy Soviet military structures following its operations in Georgia. Next, a more profound transformation was undertaken: This included the Russian state armament program to compensate for 20 years of divestment in its armed forces. It also reorganised its armed forces and built a smaller and more professional permanent force.
The transformation program also placed a high priority on joint exercises, enhanced readiness, improved training and a program to replace conscripts with contracted personnel. New equipment, new ideas about future war, a more professional force at higher readiness and lessons from recent combat in Syria.
In theory, the combination of these elements, as well as its much larger size than the Ukrainian armed forces, should have given Russia a war-winning combination in Ukraine. What has gone wrong?
One issue may be that Russian political leadership did not fully comprehend the challenges of transforming their Cold War-era military. Senior military leaders, who had not seen a major conflict in decades, conducted scripted exercises and were overly focused on new technologies, probably overestimating the impact of their reform initiatives.
Absorbed by a belief that "the very rules of war have changed … non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and exceeded the power of force of weapons", the Russian military leadership may have set the wrong goals for military effectiveness in their new force.
They certainly overlooked developing the basics of land combat: Combined arms, air-ground integration, close combat and good leadership are foundational capabilities that have been conspicuously absent in the Russian forces in Ukraine.
Was Putin kept in the dark?
Like recent revelations about falsified intelligence on Ukraine, the President of Russia was probably kept in the dark about deficiencies in the Russian military. If Putin had invested hundreds of billions of dollars in the military over the previous decade, who was going to tell him it wasn't working?
However, experienced Russia observers in the West were saying as early as 2017 that the power of the Russian military was overestimated, it was challenged by overstretch and was technologically backward. These observers have been proved right in the past two weeks.
There is an important lesson here for Western defence planners: They must have informed goals for military effectiveness in the 21st century. And, if they are surrounded by yes-men and are not transparent with the outcomes of military transformation programs, they will probably get the wrong answers, and it will be the junior soldiers, sailors, airmen and women who will suffer.
Underinvesting in ground forces
A second problem may be that the Russians got the balance of investment in different military services wrong. US scholar Michael Kofman has written that the overall focus of Russian military development from 2008 to 2014 "was to counter Western advantages in air power … To this end, much of the investment initially did not go towards Russian ground forces". Getting the balance of investment in land, air, maritime, cyber and information domains wrong can have catastrophic consequences.
Indeed, it is difficult to see evidence for where Russian investment over the past decade did go, except for some new equipment, much of which has been captured by wily Ukrainian soldiers (and farmers).
Russia's air force has been incapable of achieving air supremacy against a smaller air force. Its army has been out-thought and outfought for most of the war. The conduct of Russian information operations has been a spectacular failure compared to their Ukrainian adversaries.
Western defence planners should also take heed of this. There is a trend in some circles in several nations to focus on heavy investments in maritime warfare. It is useful for manufacturing, and there is a lot of water in the Pacific. But it is conceivable that governments might overinvest in naval forces at the cost of air, land and information operations.
It is hardly useful to sink enemy ships if you cannot then destroy their aircraft or soldiers on the ground.
And Western militaries will need to engage in close combat again: It is just a matter of time.
Learning the wrong lessons
A final insight from Russian military transformation is learning the right lessons from operations.
Gerasimov made much of the lessons from Syria. He has described how Russia had acquired "priceless combat experience in Syria". Despite this emphasis on Syria, the Russians appear to have taken away many wrong lessons.
The war in Syria was an intervention at the invitation of a host government to suppress the population.
While the Russians did not engage in large-scale ground operations, it ended up being a conflict with many lessons irrelevant to Ukraine.
After two decades of low-level counterinsurgency warfare, Western governments must also be careful about what lessons are taken from these conflicts. Rarely were Western forces challenged in the air or at sea. And there was never a time when Western forces had to fight on the land, in the air, at sea or in the cyber and information domains all at once.
However, that is the challenge of modern warfare moving forward.
Russia's poor military performance over the past two weeks has been one of the great mysteries of the war so far. Many observers have been perplexed about just how badly the Russian military has performed. While more analysis is needed, the roots of Russian failure appear to lie in faults of their military transformation program of the past decade.
And, just like most military disasters, the failures in Russian transformation and their Ukraine operations start at the top.
Mick Ryan is a strategist and recently retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. His first book, War Transformed, is about 21st-century warfare.
Russia's military is out of its depth in Ukraine. Was Putin kept in the dark about its weaknesses? - ABC News
Russia's military is out of its depth in Ukraine. Was Putin kept in the dark about its weaknesses?
In March 2017, Commander of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov wrote an article about how the Russian military was being transformed so they could fight "war in modern conditions". The article provided an update on his now seminal 2013 article on modern warfare, which many in the West mischaracterised as the "Gerasimov Doctrine". Perhaps the most interesting part of his 2017 article — and ironic for the Russian military forces — is this passage:
It has been the unity and desire to oppose aggression of the Ukrainians in the past two weeks upon which the vaunted Russian military forces have foundered. Because of this, many now question the effectiveness of Russian military reforms over the past decade. What lessons might Western military forces, and their government bosses, take from Russian military operations in Ukraine and the preceding reform program?
In theory, Russia was on the right track
Between 2008 and 2012, the Russian military discarded many of its legacy Soviet military structures following its operations in Georgia. Next, a more profound transformation was undertaken: This included the Russian state armament program to compensate for 20 years of divestment in its armed forces. It also reorganised its armed forces and built a smaller and more professional permanent force.
The transformation program also placed a high priority on joint exercises, enhanced readiness, improved training and a program to replace conscripts with contracted personnel. New equipment, new ideas about future war, a more professional force at higher readiness and lessons from recent combat in Syria.
In theory, the combination of these elements, as well as its much larger size than the Ukrainian armed forces, should have given Russia a war-winning combination in Ukraine. What has gone wrong?
One issue may be that Russian political leadership did not fully comprehend the challenges of transforming their Cold War-era military. Senior military leaders, who had not seen a major conflict in decades, conducted scripted exercises and were overly focused on new technologies, probably overestimating the impact of their reform initiatives.
Absorbed by a belief that "the very rules of war have changed … non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and exceeded the power of force of weapons", the Russian military leadership may have set the wrong goals for military effectiveness in their new force.
They certainly overlooked developing the basics of land combat: Combined arms, air-ground integration, close combat and good leadership are foundational capabilities that have been conspicuously absent in the Russian forces in Ukraine.
Was Putin kept in the dark?
Like recent revelations about falsified intelligence on Ukraine, the President of Russia was probably kept in the dark about deficiencies in the Russian military. If Putin had invested hundreds of billions of dollars in the military over the previous decade, who was going to tell him it wasn't working?
However, experienced Russia observers in the West were saying as early as 2017 that the power of the Russian military was overestimated, it was challenged by overstretch and was technologically backward. These observers have been proved right in the past two weeks.
There is an important lesson here for Western defence planners: They must have informed goals for military effectiveness in the 21st century. And, if they are surrounded by yes-men and are not transparent with the outcomes of military transformation programs, they will probably get the wrong answers, and it will be the junior soldiers, sailors, airmen and women who will suffer.
Underinvesting in ground forces
A second problem may be that the Russians got the balance of investment in different military services wrong. US scholar Michael Kofman has written that the overall focus of Russian military development from 2008 to 2014 "was to counter Western advantages in air power … To this end, much of the investment initially did not go towards Russian ground forces". Getting the balance of investment in land, air, maritime, cyber and information domains wrong can have catastrophic consequences.
Indeed, it is difficult to see evidence for where Russian investment over the past decade did go, except for some new equipment, much of which has been captured by wily Ukrainian soldiers (and farmers).
Russia's air force has been incapable of achieving air supremacy against a smaller air force. Its army has been out-thought and outfought for most of the war. The conduct of Russian information operations has been a spectacular failure compared to their Ukrainian adversaries.
Western defence planners should also take heed of this. There is a trend in some circles in several nations to focus on heavy investments in maritime warfare. It is useful for manufacturing, and there is a lot of water in the Pacific. But it is conceivable that governments might overinvest in naval forces at the cost of air, land and information operations.
It is hardly useful to sink enemy ships if you cannot then destroy their aircraft or soldiers on the ground.
And Western militaries will need to engage in close combat again: It is just a matter of time.
Learning the wrong lessons
A final insight from Russian military transformation is learning the right lessons from operations.
Gerasimov made much of the lessons from Syria. He has described how Russia had acquired "priceless combat experience in Syria". Despite this emphasis on Syria, the Russians appear to have taken away many wrong lessons.
The war in Syria was an intervention at the invitation of a host government to suppress the population.
While the Russians did not engage in large-scale ground operations, it ended up being a conflict with many lessons irrelevant to Ukraine.
After two decades of low-level counterinsurgency warfare, Western governments must also be careful about what lessons are taken from these conflicts. Rarely were Western forces challenged in the air or at sea. And there was never a time when Western forces had to fight on the land, in the air, at sea or in the cyber and information domains all at once.
However, that is the challenge of modern warfare moving forward.
Russia's poor military performance over the past two weeks has been one of the great mysteries of the war so far. Many observers have been perplexed about just how badly the Russian military has performed. While more analysis is needed, the roots of Russian failure appear to lie in faults of their military transformation program of the past decade.
And, just like most military disasters, the failures in Russian transformation and their Ukraine operations start at the top.
Mick Ryan is a strategist and recently retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. His first book, War Transformed, is about 21st-century warfare.
Russia's military is out of its depth in Ukraine. Was Putin kept in the dark about its weaknesses? - ABC News
Harry Le Hermit
Member
It would hit the fan, if we tried sanctions on China. Unlike Russia, we have a large trade deficit with China, which has persisted for years. China has extensive holdings in the USA and the USA companies have extensive exposure to China. Sanctions would devastate the economies of both, with China withholding rare minerals, etc., among other items. Plus, such sanctions would seize up Banks in the USA, that are owned by Chinese entities.
Murrmurr
SF VIP
- Location
- Sacramento, California
Certain of the CCP's holdings and assets in the US were frozen last year and we stopped issuing visas to some CCP members and their kids who were students here. I haven't seen anything about that since the first report. I'm gonna see if I can find anything new when I have time.
I'm pretty sure we are China's biggest market. I believe we sanctioned some Chinese imports a year or so ago. (Truth is, I've been so busy with our new foster child, I haven't kept current.)
What's happening in Ukraine is (in part) a wake-up call for western governments and their military leaders. A few European countries have increased their military budgets by whopping amounts. Even Sweden is paddling a different boat. And it seems the US gov't is finally beginning to stop confusing the CCP with the Chinese people, beginning to recognize they are two entirely different things. That's huge, imo, because it will ultimately lead to the realization that the CCP's power is fractured, fraught with in-fighting, extremely corrupt, and, most importantly, vulnerable.
Murrmurr
SF VIP
- Location
- Sacramento, California
By the way, @Harry Le Hermit - I really enjoy talking with you!
Harry Le Hermit
Member
Russia's trade advantage is mostly commodities, such as oil, etc. It get's murky as to how that monetary gain is spent, although it is largely suspected as being siphoned off by oligarchs, etc.
China (at ten times the economy of Russia) has a huge trade advantage with the U.S., when we buy stuff with dollars. China uses those dollars to buy up U.S. Bonds, businesses, etc. as well as buy a wide variety of commodities, to feed it's people, manufacture goods, which gets shipped to the U.S. and others. Rinse... repeat. China also is financing projects around the world with those same dollars, gaining an upper hand in relationships that have NOT benefited under the current IMF - World Bank Model. Basically, China has been buying influence with U.S. dollars and Russia failed or didn't attempt this strategy.
It should be pointed out that all the hoopla about recent U.N. votes condemning the Russian invasion... those voting against Russia made up just a bit less that half of the global population. Over half either abstained or voted against the condemnation. A good number of that citizenry despises the west, especially the USA. China would likely lead that pack and any expectation of a turnaround in opinion of the USA... can be considered a waste of time.
Any sanctions of China, would require the EU participation, which will not happen. They won't sanction oil/gas from Russia and the reasons given are the same for any Russia like sanctions on China. Plus in my opinion, the dollar as a global reserve currency would take a beating. Which spins back to financial stability of the U.S.
Just as Europe, in hindsight is questioning their reliance on Russian Energy, the U.S. has similar problems with imports. But hey, we say we would support higher fuel prices to support Ukraine, but the whining and moaning about said prices has nearly overtaken the news cycle. (I swear, if I see one more segment with a newscaster burning up fuel, driving around and taking pictures of those station price signs...!!!)
But I am a person still trying to figure out the reasoning behind the invasion. The USA and the UK were screaming it was imminent and Putin said he wasn't going to do it. Most of Europe believed Putin, so it would have seemed to be a golden opportunity to further weaken the NATO alliance, by simply saying the drills were over and begin moving troops away from the border. The USA and UK would have been made to look foolish, further fracturing any remaining resolve.
I am not convinced this was about NATO, in the beginning. It was however, about Ukraine.