https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...ence/kent-csi/vol9no3/html/v09i3a06p_0001.htm
January 17, 1945
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Memoranda for the President: Japanese Feelers
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
22 SEPT 93
CONFIDENTIAL
Documents tracing some fervent but fruitless Japanese efforts to end the war in the Pacific.
MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT: JAPANESE FEELERS
The last two volumes of the OSS Reports to the White House preserved among General Donovan's papers1 include records of several different Japanese approaches in 1945 to the Vatican and to OSS Lisbon, Bern, and Wiesbaden seeking a way to end the war. These peace feelers were generally the product of local initiative and had at most only a tacit approval from official Tokyo, where government quarreling over the question of capitulation was growing more and more desperate as the year advanced. They did not lead in any way to the eventual Japanese notes sent through standard diplomatic channels on 10 and 14 August, but they may have helped define for both sides the conditions therein drawn which made "unconditional" surrender a practical possibility.
The intelligence reports provide interesting and sometimes puzzling footnotes for Robert J. C. Butow's fastidious -- and fascinating -- reconstruction of the intricate political maneuverings that ended in Japan's Decision to Surrender.2 The documents are reproduced below.
Through the Vatican
17 January 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
On 10 January the Japanese Emperor attended a secret council meeting during which someone dared to speak about peace feelers.3
The Emperor was informed that certain Japanese individuals have been attempting to interest the highest authority at source4 in mediating the Pacific War. The Emperor did not express any disapproval of these efforts.
Someone at the meeting declared that such activities might be a useful preparation for a time more opportune than the present. The Council was skeptical of mediation possibilities, evidently believing that only force of arms would settle the conflict....'
Note the source.....the CIA and also note the opening remark about the efforts being fervent but fruitless! And the last phrase there 'evidently believing that ONLY force of arms would settle the conflict'. So there was an obvious desire not to explore surrender.
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This second link appears to be some sort of Journal of Military History, and the writers credentials are as follows: Gerhard Krebshas: has held positions at the German Institute of Japanese Studies in Tokyo and at the Institute for Military History in Potsdam, and has taught at Waseda University, Freiburg University and Berlin Free University, where he served as temporary chair from 2000 to 2004. His doctoral thesis, "Japans Deutschlandpolitik 1935-1941," 2 vols.(Hamburg, 2984), won the Japan price of the East Asia Society (OAG) in Tokyo.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/64a.pdf
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In contrast, Fujimura and Tsuyama had no problem enteringSwitzerland. Since their new host country had neither a coast nor anavy, Fujimura's post became known as "navy air force attache."39In thebeginning of March, the two men arrived in the Swiss capital of Bern,40where they lost no time in initiating their peace efforts. ....On 23April, the Japanese formally asked Hack to act as go-between with theAmericans for the Japanese navy. ...