The
Kokoda Track campaign or
Kokoda Trail campaign was part of the
Pacific War of
World War II. The campaign consisted of a series of battles fought between July and November 1942 in what was then the Australian
Territory of Papua. It was primarily a land battle, between the Japanese
South Seas Detachment under Major General
TomitarĹŤ Horii and Australian and Papuan land forces. The Japanese objective was to seize
Port Moresby by an overland advance from the north coast, following the
Kokoda Track over the mountains of the
Owen Stanley Range, as part of a strategy to isolate Australia from the United States.
Japanese forces landed and established
beachheads near
Gona and
Buna on 21 July 1942. Opposed by
Maroubra Force, then consisting of four
platoons of the
39th Battalion and elements of the
Papuan Infantry Battalion, they quickly advanced and captured
Kokoda and its strategically vital airfield on 29 July. Despite reinforcement, the Australian forces were continually pushed back.
The veteran
Second Australian Imperial Force (AIF)
21st Brigade narrowly avoided capture in the
Battle of Mission Ridge – Brigade Hill from 6 to 8 September. In the
Battle of Ioribaiwa from 13 to 16 September, the
25th Brigade under
Brigadier Kenneth Eather fought the Japanese to a halt but ceded the field to the Japanese, withdrawing back to Imita Ridge.
The Japanese advanced to within sight of Port Moresby but withdrew on 26 September. They had outrun their supply line and had been ordered to withdraw in consequence of reverses suffered at
Guadalcanal. The Australian pursuit encountered strong opposition from well prepared positions around
Templeton's Crossing and Eora Village from 11 to 28 October. Following the unopposed recapture of Kokoda,
a major battle was fought around Oivi and Gorari from 4 to 11 November, resulting in a victory for the Australians. By 16 November, two brigades of the Australian
7th Division had crossed the
Kumusi River at
Wairopi, and advanced on the Japanese beachheads in a joint Australian and United States operation. The Japanese forces at
Buna–Gona held out until 22 January 1943.
Australian reinforcement was hampered by the logistical problems of supporting a force in isolated, mountainous, jungle terrain. There were few planes available for aerial resupply, and techniques for it were still primitive. Australian command considered that the
Vickers machine gun and
medium mortars were too heavy to carry and would be ineffective in the jungle terrain. Without artillery, mortars or medium machine guns, the Australians faced an opponent equipped with mountain guns and light howitzers that had been carried into the mountains and proved to be a decisive advantage. Australian forces were unprepared to conduct a campaign in the jungle environment of New Guinea. The lessons learned during the course of this campaign and the subsequent battle of Buna–Gona led to widespread changes in doctrine, training, equipment and structure, with a legacy that remains until the present day.
In consequence of the rapid Japanese advance and the perceived failure to quickly counterattack, a "crisis of command" resulted, in which manoeuvring by General
Douglas MacArthur,
Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the
Southwest Pacific Area, and General Sir
Thomas Blamey, commander of Allied Land Forces, resulted in the sackings of three high-ranking Australian officers.
The generalship of MacArthur and Blamey has been criticised for unreasonable and unrealistic perceptions of the terrain and conditions under which the campaign was fought – to the detriment of the troops committed to the fighting. The Kokoda Track campaign has been mythologised as Australia's
Thermopylae and incorporated into the
Anzac legend
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kokoda_Track_campaign