Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals with Taliban and mass desertions - The Washington Post
Behind the collapse of the Afghan army: illicit deals and mass desertions
The spectacular collapse of Afghanistan’s military that has allowed Taliban fighters to reach Kabul’s gates on Sunday despite 20 years of training and billions of dollars in US aid
It began with a series of agreements negotiated in rural villages between the militant group and some of the lower-ranking officials of the Afghan government.
The deals, initially offered early last year, often
were described by Afghan officials as a ceasefire, but the leaders T
aliban in fact
they were offering money in exchange for government forces to hand over their weapons according to an Afghan official and a US official.
Over the next year and a half, the meetings progressed to the district level and then rapidly to the provincial capitals, culminating in an impressive series of negotiated deliveries by government forces, according to interviews with more than a dozen Afghan officers, police , special operations troops and other soldiers.
Over the past week, more than a dozen provincial capitals have fallen to Taliban forces with little or no resistance. In the early hours of Sunday, the government-held city of Jalalabad surrendered to the militants without firing, and the security forces in the districts surrounding Kabul simply vanished. Within hours, the Taliban forces arrived unopposed at the four main entrances to the Afghan capital.
The pace of the military collapse has surprised many US officials and other foreign observers, forcing the US government to dramatically accelerate efforts to withdraw personnel from its Kabul embassy.
The Taliban capitalized on the uncertainty caused by the February 2020 agreement reached in Doha, Qatar, between the militant group and the United States calling for a full American withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Some Afghan forces realized that they would soon no longer be able to count on American air power and other crucial support on the battlefield and became receptive to the Taliban’s approaches.
“Some just wanted the money,” an Afghan Special Forces official said of those who first agreed to meet with the Taliban. But others saw the US commitment to a total withdrawal as a “guarantee” that the militants would return to power in Afghanistan and wanted to secure their place on the winning side, he said. The officer spoke on condition of anonymity because, like others in this report, he was not authorized to release information to the press.
The Doha agreement, designed to end the war in Afghanistan, instead left many Afghan forces demoralized, highlighting the corrupt impulses of many Afghan officials and their
tenuous loyalty to the country’s central government. Some police officers complained that they had not been paid for six months or more.
“They saw that document as the end” the official said in reference to the majority of Afghans aligned with the government.
“The day the agreement was signed, we saw the change. Everyone was looking out to themselves. It was as if (the United States) let us fail. “
Negotiated deliveries to the Taliban gradually picked up pace in the months after the Doha agreement, according to a US official and an Afghan official. Then, after President Joe Biden announced in April that US forces would withdraw from Afghanistan this summer unconditionally, capitulations began to grow.
As militants expanded their control, government-occupied districts were increasingly left without a fight. Kunduz, the first key city invaded by militants, was captured a week ago. Days of negotiations mediated by tribal elders resulted in a surrender agreement that handed over the last government-controlled base to the Taliban.
Soon after, negotiations in the western province of Herat resulted in the resignation of the governor, senior officials from the Interior and Intelligence Ministry and hundreds of troops. The agreement was concluded in a single night.
I was so embarrassed,” said a Kabul-based Interior Ministry official, referring to the handover of senior Interior Ministry official Abdul Rahman Rahman in Herat. “I am just a small person, I am not that big. If he does that, what should I do? “
Over the past month, the southern province of Helmand also witnessed a massive surrender. And when the Taliban fighters locked themselves in the southeastern province of Ghazni, its governor fled under the protection of the Taliban only to be arrested by the Afghan government on his way back to Kabul.
Several capable and motivated elite units have participated in the Afghan army’s fight against the Taliban. But they were often dispatched to provide back-up to less well-trained police and army units that have repeatedly withdrawn under pressure from the Taliban.
An Afghan special forces officer stationed in Kandahar who had been assigned to guard a critical border crossing recalled being ordered by a commander to surrender.
“We want to fight! If we surrender, the Taliban will kill us. “said the Special Forces officer.
Don't fire a single shot,” the commander told them as the Taliban swarmed the area, the officer later recounted.
Border police immediately surrendered, leaving the Special Forces unit alone. A second officer confirmed his colleague’s recollection of the events.
Not wanting to surrender or fight for the lowest, the unit downed their weapons, changed into civilian clothes, and fled their post.
“I am ashamed of what I have done,” said the first officer. But he said that if he had not fled, “my own government would have sold me to the Taliban.”
When an Afghan police officer was asked about his force’s apparent lack of motivation, he explained that
they have not been receiving their wages. Several Afghan policemen on the front lines in Kandahar before the city’s fall said that
they had not been paid in six to nine months. The rewards from the Taliban have become increasingly attractive.
“Without the United States, there was no fear of being caught up in corruption. He took the traitors out of our army, ”said an Afghan police officer.
Several officers from the Kandahar police force said that
corruption was more to blame for collapse than incompetence. “I honestly don’t think it can be fixed. I think they need something completely new, ”said Ahmadullah Kandahari, an officer in the Kandahar police force.
In the days leading up to Kandahar’s capture earlier this month, the number of victims in the police had become visible. Bacha, a 34-year-old police commander, had been constantly retiring for more than three months. He had hunched over and his garb more ragged. In an interview, he said that repeated withdrawals had bruised his pride, but that he was
unpaid, which made him feel desperate.
“The last time I saw you, the Taliban were offering $ 150 for anyone in the government to surrender and join them,” he told a journalist as the interview came to an end. “You know, what is the price now?”
He didn’t laugh and several of his men leaned forward, eager to hear the answer.
illegal deals
unpaid soldiers and police
corrupt government
''mass desertions'' ~ so massive that the trillion dollar Afghan army collapsed under it.
Small wonder why the vast majority of the Afghanistan populace are so readily disposed to side with the Taliban.